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Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis
Stephen S Morse, Jonna A K Mazet, Mark Woolhouse, Colin R Parrish, Dennis Carroll, William B Karesh, Carlos Zambrana-Torrelio, 
W Ian Lipkin, Peter Daszak
Most pandemics—eg, HIV/AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome, pandemic infl uenza—originate in animals, 
are caused by viruses, and are driven to emerge by ecological, behavioural, or socioeconomic changes. Despite their 
substantial eff ects on global public health and growing understanding of the process by which they emerge, no 
pandemic has been predicted before infecting human beings. We review what is known about the pathogens that 
emerge, the hosts that they originate in, and the factors that drive their emergence. We discuss challenges to their 
control and new eff orts to predict pandemics, target surveillance to the most crucial interfaces, and identify 
prevention strategies. New mathematical modelling, diagnostic, communications, and informatics technologies can 
identify and report hitherto unknown microbes in other species, and thus new risk assessment approaches are 
needed to identify microbes most likely to cause human disease. We lay out a series of research and surveillance 
opportunities and goals that could help to overcome these challenges and move the global pandemic strategy from 
response to pre-emption.
Introduction
The emergence of novel infectious diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 
and pandemic infl uenza has shown the vulnerability of 
human beings to new zoonotic health threats. The 
mortality and morbidity associated with HIV/AIDS have 
devastated communities in some countries and led to 
global changes in public health. The rapid pandemic 
spread of SARS coronavirus in 2003 and a new triple-
reassortant H1N1 infl uenza in 2009 both resulted in 
substantial economic loss as the pathogens exploited—
and in some instances closed down—global travel and 
trade networks.1 These vulnerabilities empha sise the 
need for a systematic, pre-emptive approach that aims to 
prevent the spread, or even the initial emergence, 
of pandemics.
The emergence of novel pandemic agents often seems 
to be inherently unpredictable.2 Indeed, no pathogens 
have been predicted before their fi rst appearance. How-
ever, patterns in the origins and spread of new pathogens 
can be noted and are an intrinsic, albeit ad-hoc, part of 
surveillance strategy. For example, more than 60% of the 
roughly 400 emerging infectious diseases that have been 
identifi ed since 1940 are zoonotic,3 and these pathogens 
are the focus of particular public health interest.4,5 
Similarly, specifi c geographical regions or inter faces 
between people, wildlife, livestock, and the environment 
have been identifi ed as the origins of recent emerging 
infectious diseases, and thus are targets for intense 
surveillance.3,5–7 Analysis of previous emergence  events 
has led to a better understanding of the causes (so-called 
drivers) of emergence.6,8 These advances, coupled with a 
better understanding of the dynamics of pathogen 
transmission, ecology, and evo lution as they emerge and 
spread, promise the possibility to predict pandemics. 
Here we review these fi ndings and the most promising 
strategies to improve anticipation, prediction, and pre-
emption of the next pandemic zoonosis at the source.
Search strategy and selection criteria
We searched PubMed and ISI Web of Knowledge with the 
terms “emerging infectio*”, “zoonos*”, or “pathogen 
discovery” in combination with the terms “modeling”, 
“prediction”, “surveillance”, “evolution”, “ecology”, or 
“methodology” for papers published in any language before 
Sept 25, 2012. We did our searches when we began to 
develop and write the paper and again before submission of 
the revised, fi nal version. Some coauthors provided 
references that they deemed of particular importance. We 
largely selected publications from the past 5 years, but did 
not exclude commonly referenced and highly regarded older 
publications. We also searched the reference lists of articles 
identifi ed by our searches and selected those judged 
relevant. Reviews and book chapters are cited to provide 
readers with more detailed information and references than 
is possible in the space allowed. Our reference list was 
modifi ed on the basis of comments from peer reviewers.
Key messages
• Most recent pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome, and 
pandemic infl uenza, are caused by zoonotic pathogens (ie, pathogens harboured by 
non-human animals), are viral diseases, and originated in wildlife
• Such infections are usually driven to emerge by ecological, behavioural, or 
socioeconomic changes
• Technological advances in mathematical modelling, diagnostics, communication, 
and informatics enable targeted global surveillance of emerging and previously 
unknown infections in both human beings and other species
• New risk-assessment approaches show promise for the use of these capabilities to 
predict and pre-empt potential pandemics at their source (eg, in wildlife or other 
animals), and need to be further developed
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Origins and dynamics of pandemic zoonoses
When the origins of emerging infectious diseases are 
traced back to fi rst emergence in the human population, 
some distinctive patterns are revealed that could be 
used in disease control.3,6 First, the frequency with which 
new pathogens emerge is increasing, even when the 
increased surveillance globally is taken into account,3 
suggesting that eff orts to coordinate the global strategy to 
fi ght pandemics are timely and of growing im portance.9,10 
Second, the emergence of all major groups of emerging 
infectious diseases correlates strongly with human popu-
lation density, supporting the hypothesis that disease 
emergence is driven by largely anthropogenic changes, 
such as the expansion of agriculture, travel routes, and 
trade, and changes in land use.11 Finally, the emergence 
of zoonotic pathogens of wildlife origin (which have 
dominated the pandemics of the past 100 years) correlates 
strongly with both human density and the global 
distribution of wildlife biodiversity.3,8 Spatially explicit 
models can be used to identify the regions most likely to 
produce the next emerging zoonoses (so-called hotspots 
of emerging infectious disease).3 These hotspots are 
regions where human activities take place against a 
background of high wildlife biodiversity, with concomitant 
microbial biodiversity (fi gure 1). Targeting of surveillance 
to such regions pro vides a rationale for better allocation 
of global resources to prevent emerging infectious disease 
or rapidly deal with outbreaks.3
The process through which pandemic zoonoses 
emerge can be analysed to identify the crucial control 
points and specifi c research challenges (panel 1, 
fi gure 2). The model we adopt here (developed by 
Daszak) to assess pandemic potential has three stages—
no human infection (stage 1), localised human infection 
(spillover; stage 2), and widespread transmission and 
global dissemination (stage 3). The frequency at which 
stages 1 and 2 occur is unknown but probably high. 
That human populations are continually exposed to a 
wide variety of non-human-animal pathogens, many of 
which infect human beings, seems reasonable to 
assume. To assess the role of pathogen biology in 
emergence, investigators need to know how many 
pathogens people are exposed to and how many 
successfully cross the species barrier. A complete 
inventory of spillovers is not available, but researchers 
have a good working know ledge of pathogens of 
domestic livestock and pets (species in frequent contact 
with human beings). Almost 50% of the roughly 
1000 species of pathogens that are noted in livestock 
and pets are zoonotic,17 implying that any barriers 
between these hosts and human beings are routinely 
breached by many diff erent pathogens. More than 50% 
of the recognised pathogens of human beings can 
infect other vertebrate hosts.18 Many non-human 
pathogens can infect several hosts, and clear examples 
of viruses transferring between diff erent animal hosts 
to cause outbreaks in other species have been 
reported.17,19 Pathogens can transfer from human beings 
to animals and between diff erent animal species before 
being trans ferred back to people, allowing remixing 
and evolution with spill-back and potentially enhanced 
pathogenicity (eg, infl uenza).20,21
Human pathogens from all taxa contain zoonotic 
species. Roughly 80% of viruses, 50% of bacteria, 40% of 
fungi, 70% of protozoa, and 95% of helminths that infect 
human beings are zoonotic.18 Most of the identifi ed 
reservoirs are mammalian (roughly 80%) or, to a lesser 
extent, avian,18,22 although people share some pathogens 
with invertebrates, which act as vectors23 or inter mediate 
hosts. Identifi cation of the key taxonomic groups that are 
sources for the emergence of zoonotic disease could help 
to improve targeting of surveillance and interventions. 
Ungulates are the mammalian taxa with which human 
beings share the most pathogens17—perhaps not surprising 
because, as major food sources, these animals are often in 
close proximity to people, and their diseases have been 
studied extensively. Rodents, carnivores, and primates are 
also well represented. Although pathogens deemed emerg-
ing or re-emerging are disproportionately likely to be 
zoonotic,18 their reservoirs are much the same as those of 
non-emerging zoonoses.22
The situation, however, is substantially diff erent for 
pathogens that have reached stage 3. A disproportionate 
number of these pathogens are viruses, suggesting that 
viruses have the potential to evolve more rapidly than do 
other kinds of pathogen. However, this fi nding could be 
due to ascertainment bias. Less complete knowledge is 
available about the diversity of viruses than that of other 
pathogens, and researchers might still be missing many 
at stages 1 and 2.24 Although a lot of stage 3 pathogens that 
infect only people don’t strictly have reservoirs (eg, 
HIV-1), many are thought to have had zoonotic origins, 
including in non-human primates, which con trasts 
strongly with the minor contribution of primates as 
High risk
Moderate risk
Low risk
Figure 1: Global hotspots for emerging infectious diseases that originate in wildlife
A database of all known emerging infectious diseases3 since 1940 was used to identify the most likely origins of 
each separate emergence event. Presence or absence of infections emerging from wildlife was analysed with 
logistic regression against a series of known drivers, including human population density, change in human 
population density, and wildlife diversity (mammalian species richness), gridded at 1 km² resolution. The global 
distribution of model outputs gives a measure of the likelihood of a region to generate a new zoonotic emerging 
infectious disease that originates in wildlife. Because previous pandemics have mainly originated in wildlife, these 
maps identify hotspots where the next pandemic is most likely to originate.
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reservoirs for zoo noses in general. If risk is a function of 
contact frequency and probability of successful adap-
tation to human beings, pathogens acquired from other 
primates might already be better adapted to successful 
transmission than those from other mammals (exposure 
from rodents, bats,25 and other common vertebrates are 
the most frequent).
Many pandemic zoonoses (ie, those that reach stage 3), 
such as HIV/AIDS,26 have achieved sustained person-to-
person transmission without the need for a non-human 
reservoir. For ex ample, SARS, which originated from the 
SARS-like coronaviruses of bats, emerged in China in 
2003 and was due to hunting and trading of bats for 
food.27 In the wildlife markets of southern China these bat 
viruses seemed to become stage 1 pathogens, which 
spilled over to civets before being trans mitted to people 
and achieving stage 2.28 SARS coronavirus then under-
went repeated cycles of transmission in people, and 
spread nationally and then globally (ie, reached stage 3), 
including 251 cases as far away as Toronto. Non-human 
hosts can have a role in the maintenance and transmission 
of some stage 3 pathogens (eg, infl uenza A virus).20,21 Of 
Panel 1: Stages in disease emergence
Several researchers have separated the process of emergence into distinct steps or 
stages. Morse originally divided the process into two steps, introduction (into a new 
species, such as human beings) and establishment/dissemination.6,12 Wolfe and 
colleagues13 subsequently developed a model with fi ve stages—a so-called pathogen 
pyramid—to represent successively greater pathogen adaptation to successful human 
infection and transmission, from inability to infect human beings (stage 1) to exclusively 
human disease (stage 5).
Figure 2 shows an alternative depiction of the stages of emergence, which emphasises the 
dynamics of infection rather than pathogen properties. The frequency of these events 
probably diminishes from stage 1 to stage 2, and the fi nal stage, true pandemic 
emergence (ie, intercontinental spread of a pathogen in human beings), is far rarer than 
the initial localised emergence events.
Stage 1 (pre-emergence): the putative pandemic pathogen is still in its natural reservoir. 
Ecological, social, or socioeconomic changes (eg, change in land use) alter the dynamics of 
pathogen transmission within the host or between hosts and allow the pathogen to 
expand within its host population, spread to a new region, or be transmitted to another 
non-human host population or species. Each of these changes increases the likelihood of 
the pathogen making contact with and spilling over into human beings (and thus 
progressing to stage 2).1,6,7 The drivers that cause stage 1 emergence tend to be large-scale 
environmental, agricultural, or demographic shifts— eg, moving of livestock to a region 
for the fi rst time, or transportation of wildlife from a region for food. Such events 
happened before the emergence of Nipah virus in Malaysia in 1997, after intensively 
managed pig farms and fruit orchards were built in a region frequented by fruit bats (the 
natural reservoir). These bats began to feed on fruit trees around pigsties, enabling viral 
transmission to pigs and stage 1 emergence.14 Similarly, change in land use in Africa has 
brought livestock, people, and wildlife into the same habitat, leading to multidirectional 
pathogen transmission between livestock and non-human primates (stage 1), and some 
spillover into people (stage 2).15
Stage 2 (localised emergence): initial spillover of a wildlife or livestock pathogen to 
people. Causes range from handling of butchered wildlife to exposure to fomites in 
wildlife markets or livestock farms, or in the wild. Outcomes vary widely, from small 
clusters of human cases (eg, Menangle virus)16 to large outbreaks, some with limited 
person-to-person transmission (eg, Ebola virus) and some without (eg, Hendra virus).
Stage 3 (full pandemic emergence): sustained person-to-person transmission and 
large-scale spread, often aided by global air travel (eg, HIV/AIDS, severe acute respiratory 
syndrome) or the international movement of reservoir hosts or vectors through trade 
(eg, West Nile virus).  Stage 3 pandemics are rare because even pathogens capable of 
some person-to-person transmission might not be able to maintain long enough chains 
of transmission to spread (eg, Nipah virus in Bangladesh).
Figure 2: Emergence of pandemic zoonotic disease 
Stage 1 is a pre-emergence state, in which naturally occurring microbes are 
transmitted between their animal reservoirs. Disturbances to the ecology of these 
populations (eg, due to changes in land use) change the dynamics of microbial 
transmission and can lead to a heightened risk of pathogen spillover to other 
non-human wildlife or livestock hosts (but not people). Stage 2 is localised 
emergence, either through self-limiting spillover events (green peaks and troughs, 
representing the rise and fall in numbers of infected people with time) or 
large- scale spillover (red peaks, representing spikes in the number of infected 
people with time), that leads to person-to-person transmission for a few 
pathogen generations. In stage 3, some spillover events might lead to indefi nitely 
sustained person-to-person outbreaks, international or global spread, and the 
emergence of a true pandemic. The size, spread, and potential eff ect of events 
increase from stage 1 to stage 3, but the frequency falls so that full stage 3 
pandemics are quite rare. By dissecting this process and analysing the interactions 
of the underlying drivers with the risk of spillover and spread, development of a 
more structured approach to pandemic prevention is possible. The ultimate goal 
of successful pandemic prevention is to move the control point to stage 1.
Stage 1 Pre-emergence
Stage 2 Localised emergence
Stage 3 Pandemic emergence
Expansion of the wildlife–human being interface
• Nipah virus
• Ebola virus
International travel and trade
• HIV/AIDS
• Severe acute respiratory syndrome
Encroachment into wildlife habitat
Change in land use
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the 400 or so known emerging pathogens, roughly 
100 occur only as human pathogens—ie, such special-
isation is rare.29 Some of the seemingly specialist human 
patho gens are thought to have had zoonotic origins much 
further back in evolutionary time (eg, Plasmodium 
falciparum).30 This pattern could be the norm, but the 
origins of most specialist human pathogens are un-
known.13 Much more is known about the dynamics of 
pandemic pathogens once they can be transmitted among 
people. Transmission rates are often higher in dense than 
in sparse populations, and spread is often greatly 
enhanced by air travel or human migration. The 
mathematics of these spreading events is well known, 
and a sophisticated array of compu tational models have 
been used to back-predict such events accurately—eg, the 
fi rst case clusters of SARS31 and the subsequent global 
spread, including the country-by-country distri bution of 
human cases.32 Models based on air travel, realistic 
human contact networks, and individual coun tries’ 
capacities to deal with outbreaks can now produce 
reasonably accurate predictions of future pan demic 
spread (par ticularly for infl uenza).33–35 However, less is 
known about the factors that enable pathogens to move 
from stage 2 to stage 3 and ultimately achieve pandemic 
status. During this process, stuttering chains of novel 
human trans mission (as with human monkeypox in 
Africa, for example36,37) can become self-sustaining (which 
monkey pox has still not achieved in people36). The 
distribution and behaviour of human beings, reservoir 
hosts, and vectors are crucial for emergence, and human 
demo graphics and behaviour often establish capacity for 
person-to-person transmission.
Diff erential host physiology, especially age and immuno-
 competence, aff ect susceptibility to infection.38,39 The surge 
in immunocompromised patients during the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic was associated with an upsurge in other 
emerging pathogens.7,9 Host factors often receive less 
research focus than does pathogen virulence, but 
improved knowledge of host responses is essential to 
understand the species barrier and why some zoonotic 
pathogens are benign in their natural hosts but lethal 
when introduced to other species.38,39
In view of the importance of human activities in 
emergence, integration of social sciences research—
particularly that focused on human behaviour and demo-
graphics—into models of infectious disease emergence 
and evolution is essential to understand pandemics.40,41 
The importance of human exposure throughout the 
emergence process also suggests that simple behavioural 
precautions could greatly reduce risk. Risks to hunters, 
food handlers, and livestock workers from occupational 
exposure could be reduced in hotspots of emerging 
infectious diseases though routine sanitation and bio-
safety precautions, as has been tried with H5N1 in 
agricultural settings.42 Nosocomial spread could be 
prevented by stringent adherence to infection control 
practices—eg, use of sterile injection equipment.
A successful pathogen needs to possess the molecular 
machinery to infect people, invade human cells or 
tissues, replicate, and access tissues from which it can 
exit the host and transmit (directly or indirectly) to other 
people.38,43 Historical examples are few, and thus to 
quantify the relative contribution of exposure frequency 
versus phylogenetic relatedness to the risk of successful 
infection is diffi  cult. Analysis of host–pathogen data-
bases of primates shows that closely related sympatric 
host species are more likely to share parasite species than 
are distantly related sympatric host species.44 Although 
any pathogen from a mammalian (or avian) host is a 
potential threat, that exposure of people to novel 
pathogens from our closest animal relatives poses the 
greater risk to public health is at least plausible.
Microbes often evolve substantially during emergence 
(eg, SIVcpz evolved into HIV-1), and the role of evo-
lutionary adaptation in enabling pathogen establish-
ment in human populations is a subject of active 
research.45,46 Alternatively, some pathogens can spread 
between human beings without evolutionary change 
from the genotypes present in the wildlife host 
(eg, Ebola virus), and thus can enter the human popu-
lation at stage 2. Phylodynamics, which combines a 
modelling frame work for host, epidemiological, and 
molecular data,47,48 especially for RNA viruses, shows 
particular promise for understanding of patterns of 
viral evolution during epidemics.48,49
Testing of the relative importance of exposure and host 
relatedness in stage 2 emergence is an important 
challenge. For plant patho gens, experimental infection of 
closely or distantly related plants with a range of fungal 
pathogens has shown that host relatedness is a key factor 
in the ability of a pathogen to infect a novel host.50 Such a 
study would be logistically and ethically challenging in 
mammals, but experimental work with several model 
systems and various other organisms is underway, and 
systematic studies of host–parasite data bases might 
provide an alternative. These studies might provide new 
surveillance opportunities by allowing improved 
targeting of the key wildlife species most likely to harbour 
the next emerging zoonosis.
Pathogen discovery
Identifi cation of zoonotic pathogens has been substan-
tially improved by advances in molecular diagnostics, 
which make possible the identifi cation of hitherto 
unknown patho gens in nature (so-called pathogen 
discovery).51,52 This process also includes diff erential 
diagnosis of infectious disease and surveillance for known 
or novel microbes that are normally benign in natural 
hosts but have the potential to become pathogenic in other 
hosts. Traditionally, microbe hunters used many tech-
niques, including in-vitro and in-vivo culture, immuno-
histo chemistry, electron microscopy, and serology. 
Immuno histochemistry of clinical samples was used 
successfully in several cases. Molecular techniques were 
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used to fi rst identify sin nombre virus, Nipah virus, West 
Nile virus, SARS coronavirus, and Lujo virus, among 
others. With the advent of unbiased molecular methods, 
the use of visualisation techniques has already begun to 
shift from discovery to provision of evidence of causal 
relations between an infectious agent and disease, by 
locating evidence of the agent at sites of pathological 
changes, including in both chronic and acute disease.51
Rapid, cost-eff ective molecular techniques allow broad- 
scale screening of samples, and pathogen discovery could 
be a strategy in wildlife to pre-empt pandemic zoonotic 
disease emergence through early identifi cation. This 
strategy might be par ticularly eff ective when enhanced by 
hotspot modelling, which allows targeting of specifi c 
regions with the highest spillover risks. Historically, most 
surveillance eff orts have been designed to detect individual 
patho gens in natural reservoirs, vectors, or at-risk human 
or animal populations through use of individual (so-called 
singleplex) PCR assays or serology. However, the costs 
for multiplex PCR, micro arrays, and high-throughput 
sequencing continue to fall, and thus these assays are 
increasingly used as primary techniques for syndromic 
surveillance and studies of microbial diversity and 
discovery.51,52 The challenge with any of these tech nologies 
is determination of the relevance of a microbial signature. 
5000 species of mammals and 10 000 species of birds are 
known, each of which probably has at least several unique 
endemic viruses. Therefore the total number of new 
pathogens awaiting discovery is probably far higher than 
the 2000 to 3000 characterised. When other vertebrate-
associated microbes are also considered, clearly the 
unfocused application of high-throughput screening could 
rapidly exhaust resources without substantively reducing 
pandemic risk. Therefore, discovery eff orts need to be 
directed toward reservoirs and vectors where human 
being–animal interfaces6 and hotspot modelling3 or other 
infor mation suggest an increased risk of trans mission. In 
the past few years, the abundance and availability of 
molecular sequence data have made possible the identifi -
cation of unknown microbes in nature based on 
similarities to the sequences of known organisms, even in 
crude nucleic acid extracts (so-called metagenomics).51,52 
This approach has clear value during the early stages of 
emergence. However, sequence data became available 
while an epidemic was still in progress for the fi rst time 
only during the West Nile outbreak in 1999, and then again 
during the 2003 SARS outbreak and the 2009 infl uenza 
H1N1 pandemic. This information was invaluable for 
rapid development of diagnostics, identifi cation of the 
source of the infection, and pathogen discovery. However, 
the rapid sequencing and identifi cation of new pathogens 
before large-scale spread remain a substantial challenge.
Prediction of pandemic potential in novel 
microbes
Advances in meta-genomic technology have led to eff orts 
in which molecular data are prospectively used to iden tify 
potential human pathogens in other species. The goal of 
such studies is to characterise novel microbes and assess 
probable virulence and transmissibility in people. How-
ever, crucial challenges exist in prediction of the eff ects of 
these new microbes, especially for viruses.53 In some cases 
(eg, coronaviruses54), host range can at least partially be 
predicted by receptor specifi city and other factors.24,54 When 
virulence factors are known (as for many bacteria38), meta-
genomic analysis for these factors can be very useful.52 
Such analysis is more challenging with viruses than with 
other microbes,19,43,55 although the experimental develop-
ment of mutations in H5N1 that increase trans missibility 
in a ferret model has allowed targeted surveillance for 
isolates that are most likely to become effi  cient human 
pathogens.56 However, even when puta tive human patho-
gens can infect human-cell cultures, they are often unable 
to infect people. Genetically humanised murine models 
have been developed for SARS57 and hepatitis C virus 
(which usually can infect only human beings and 
chimpanzees).58 Humanised mice,59 or other model 
systems, could perhaps be adapted to screen for the ability 
of newly discovered microbes from wildlife reservoirs to 
infect people. Workers at the Rockefeller Foundation Virus 
Program in the mid-20th century used a low-tech version 
of the strategy—intra cerebral inocu lation— on suckling 
mice, which are susceptible to many infections by this 
route.60 However, screening in human ised mice is not yet 
widely available. In most cases, prediction of human 
virulence or trans missibility from molecular or phylo-
genetic data alone is still not feasible (another crucial 
unmet need), although promising work has been done 
with in-vitro tests to assess ability to induce a hyper-
infl ammatory cytokine response in human cells as a 
predictor of virulence.61,62 Molecular data will be of 
increasing predictive value as the global genomic data-
base expands, thereby allowing wider comparisons and 
identifi cation of commonalities. The predictive value will 
increase further if these molecular data are correlated with 
epidemiological and clinical data, and as our understanding 
of host requisites for trans mission and barriers to cross-
species transfer improves. As programmes for pathogen 
dis covery in wildlife expand rapidly, the development of 
risk assess ment criteria for the importance of these 
microbes is crucial. In our opinion, crucial questions 
remain and further research could substantially improve 
our under standing and our capacity to prevent pandemics 
before they emerge (panel 2).
These research questions are part of a much-needed 
basic research programme to investigate prediction of 
pandemics. However, previous evidence of pathogen 
spillover is a simple predictor of possible future emer-
gence, and an active interface between human beings and 
other species is an obvious sine qua non. The capacity of 
a novel virus to transmit to people, and especially to cause 
illness, is a clue that the virus can replicate well in human 
beings, and thus could gain the properties that allow 
onward transmission. Spillover infections just below the 
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threshold for self-sustainment in people (ie, infections 
with a basic reproduction number slightly <1) have been 
suggested as the prime epidemics-in-waiting,75,76 although 
they are diffi  cult to identify in advance. Thus, spillover 
events of any magnitude should be carefully monitored. 
For H5N1, intensive monitoring of each spillover case in 
endemic countries is crucial for prediction of if and when 
this pathogen moves from stage 2 to 3. Additionally, 
because pandemic zoonoses are such a large threat to 
global public health, to understand the ecological, 
virological, and social rules governing their emergence 
seems important. A concerted, interdisciplinary research 
Panel 2: Prediction of pandemic potential
Programmes for pathogen discovery (including within wildlife 
populations) are expanding rapidly, and development of risk 
assessment and prioritisation criteria for these microbes is 
crucial. Several lines of inquiry could substantially increase 
capacity to prevent pandemics before emergence.
• Research about the relative importance of host relatedness 
versus contact frequency: evidence shows that pathogens 
from closely related host species might be better able to 
spill over from one to the other.63 Emerging pathogens in 
people have originated in both closely related host species 
(eg, HIV-1 from chimpanzees26) and distantly related hosts 
with which human beings have had close recent contact 
(eg, severe acute respiratory syndrome from bats and 
civets,27 Nipah virus from bats and pigs,14 infl uenza from 
pigs and birds20,64).
• Analysis of viral relatedness as a predictor of emergence: 
wildlife viruses that are more closely related to known human 
pathogens are often assumed to be more likely to infect 
people than are those not similar to human pathogens. 
However, with the possible exception of the 
orthomyxoviruses and paramyxoviruses, the viral families 
that caused the most important recent zoonoses in human 
beings (ie, lentiviruses and coronaviruses) were recognised to 
have the potential for emergence only after they had already 
done so. Analysis of viral traits and phylogenetic relations, and 
how these correlate with pathogenicity after a virus spills over, 
will be crucial.65,66
• Host range and plasticity: emerging pathogens often have a 
broad host range. Pathogens that are more able to undergo 
successful transmission between diff erent host taxa are also 
more likely to infect human beings than are those less able 
to transmit between diff erent host taxa.22 These 
mechanisms should be elucidated and predictive 
correlations made.
• Estimates of a virus’s ability to evolve: the factors that allow 
a pathogen to successfully jump species are poorly known, 
but might include high mutability and an absence of 
proofreading to correct mutations, which are thought to 
explain the high proportion of negative-stranded RNA 
viruses in emerging pathogens.19,29 So-called evolvability67 
might help to explain why some pathogens have a high 
propensity for host jumps.19
• Research about host–receptor interactions: receptor binding is 
an essential fi rst step in cell infection and has been associated 
with changes in host and tissue tropism.19,24,45 Prediction of 
receptor binding necessitates understanding of the 
interactions for commonly expressed receptors (eg, sialic 
acids or heparan sulfate proteoglycans) or ease of adaptation 
of the virus to a new host receptor.24 However, the cell 
receptor is still unknown for more than 50% of human 
viruses. Highly host-specifi c receptor structures are a barrier to 
infection of a new host. Receptor binding is a necessary (but 
not suffi  cient) condition to enable viral entry to a cell and 
successful replication. Changing of receptor affi  nity (from 
avian-type to mammalian-type) was the fi rst step in the 
adaption of H5N1 avian infl uenza virus to mammalian 
transmission, but other mutations were also needed.68,69 
Intracellular barriers and host resistance factors also exist for 
many viruses.43,55,70,71 Viral genes that interfere with these 
functions might be identifi ed on the basis of signatures or 
similarity to known genes.
• Capacity to exploit new routes of transmission: widespread 
outbreaks are often correlated with high transmission 
effi  ciency, which might be partly related to the route or 
frequency of spread.72 Human behaviour is an important 
component that should be integrated into any predictive 
model,41 but the aspects of behaviour that matter are 
established by the pathogen’s mode of transmission.
• Prediction of virulence in human beings: along with 
prediction of human transmissibility, perhaps the biggest 
challenge is to assess the likelihood that a wildlife or 
livestock virus will cause noteworthy disease if the virus 
does infect people. True risk to human beings is related to 
both the transmissibility of a pathogen and the severity of 
the disease that results, and many zoonotic viruses that 
infect people cause no disease (eg, simian foamy viruses73) 
or mild symptoms (eg, Menangle virus16). Why some 
viruses that are benign in their natural hosts induce a 
severe or lethal hyperinfl ammatory response in a new host 
(eg, Ebola virus, sin nombre virus) is not well understood, 
but the causative pathogen components or structures 
should be identifi ed and the mechanisms of species 
specifi city further elucidated.
• Patterns of host–virus coevolution: coevolutionary 
relationships in a group of related viruses and their wildlife 
hosts can be assessed easily by analysing genetic sequences.74 
Strong patterns of coevolution during recent evolutionary 
time suggest stable long-term interactions with little 
host-switching, but pathogens that have frequently moved 
from one host to another have poorly aligned coevolutionary 
trees. Improved understanding of the pathogen’s 
opportunities for transfer are needed for prediction.
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focus on the process of disease emergence is urgently 
needed, and should include all sectors of the medical 
sciences, ecologists, social scien tists, and wildlife 
biologists, among others.
Global strategy for surveillance and prevention
For emerging infections, strengthening of public health 
surveillance worldwide to provide early warning has been 
the primary recommendation of expert groups for the 
past two decades.4,5,10,77,78 Although greatly improved, 
public health surveillance capabilities remain restricted 
and fragmented, and have uneven global coverage.20,64,79 
ProMED and the ProMED-mail e-mail LISTSERV and 
website were developed in the 1990s to improve early- 
warning cap acity.77 This notion has expanded substan-
tially, with a series of new initiatives such as WHO’s 
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network;80 a 
tripartite One Health initiative involving WHO, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the UN, and the World 
Organisation for Animal Health; HealthMap.org (and 
similarly Canada’s Global Public Health Intelligence 
Network), a system that does high-capacity searching and 
fi ltering of internet feeds to identify novel pathogen 
outbreaks as rapidly as possible;81 and, in the USA, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Global 
Disease Detection programme, the Department of De-
fense’s Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and 
Response System, and other initiatives. These initiatives 
have been assisted by regional coordination and the 
formation of, for example, the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control, and subregional net-
works such as the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance 
Network.82,83 The adoption of the revised International 
Health Regulations, which have a target of establishment 
of minimum core capacities, or specifi c plans, by mid-
2012, by the 194 member states of WHO was a noteworthy 
advance.84 The revised Regulations incorporate a broad 
defi nition of outbreaks of public health concern, which 
include outbreaks in non-human animals, and provides 
an incentive for low-income countries to build capacity 
for pandemic surveillance and prevention. Although 
implementation will probably be delayed because many 
countries have so far been unable to achieve minimum 
core capacity goals, the adoption of the Regulations 
should greatly improve standards for surveillance, 
reporting, and response.82
Eff orts to reduce or prevent pandemic zoonoses before 
they emerge in people have also begun, and might form 
the template for a new, globally coordinated pandemic 
prevention strategy. For infl uenza, these eff orts have been 
focused on animal surveillance as a strategy to identify 
periods when the risk of spillover to people is high.64 Wider 
surveillance in wildlife to include targeted pathogen 
discovery has been called for.3,5,7,64 However, few coordinated 
eff orts have been implemented to pre-empt zoonotic 
disease emergence with wildlife sur veillance. The 
Emerging Pandemic Threats programme is a noteworthy 
project initiated in 2009 by the US Agency for International 
Development. The programme is a suite of capacity-
building investments designed to rapidly identify (and 
eventually predict) the emergence of new public health 
threats and increase country-level capacities to mitigate the 
potential eff ects of these threats.85 It draws heavily from 
eff orts to address the H5N1 threat, and emphasises a 
strategic approach that builds on the understanding that 
the health and well being of people, animals, and the 
environment are inextricably linked; promotes a One 
Health approach that spans the animal health, public 
health, environ mental, and conservation communities;86 
targets promo tion of policies and capacities to identify and 
minimise the risk of emergence of new disease; and uses a 
risk-based approach to target investments where the likeli-
hood of disease emergence is greatest.
The Emerging Pandemic Threats programme, through 
its PREDICT component, has developed an approach in 
which predictive modelling is used to identify the regions, 
wildlife hosts, and human being–animal interfaces most 
likely to propagate the next emerging zoonosis. The 
approach brings together experts from specialties, includ-
ing wildlife ecology, epi demiology, genetics, virology, 
informatics, and veterinary medicine, all focused on 
building of a global early warning system for emerging 
diseases that move be tween wildlife and people. The 
programme’s fi rst goal is to obtain timely and reliable data 
for zoonotic threats, through internet surveillance of 
reports of unusual events in hotspot countries, analyses of 
the capacity of pathogens to emerge and then spread 
under diff erent social systems in hotspots, and in-depth 
sample collection from the wildlife hosts most likely to 
harbour zoonoses. Samples are analysed to identify 
known zoonotic pathogens and new, closely related 
viruses, and then those deemed most likely to infect and 
cause illness in people are more fully characterised.
PREDICT is active in 20 developing countries in 
emerging infectious disease hotspots and focuses on 
surveillance at human being–animal interfaces where 
cross-species trans mission is most likely. Infection in the 
natural or reservoir hosts is often asymptomatic,20 and 
thus testing of seemingly healthy animals is essential, but 
might be resource intensive, and unproductive if done 
randomly. To avoid this issue, PREDICT uses a combin-
ation of risk modelling to target locations, interfaces, and 
host taxa, and computerised data collection and analysis 
and active wildlife fi eld sampling at high-risk sites to 
collect and identify viruses that might transfer from 
wildlife and cause disease. The programme partners with 
national and local govern ments, in-country scientists, 
and other local specialists who are active in outbreak 
reporting, microbial characterisation, and pathogen 
discovery, in collaboration with other US Agency for 
International Development  Emerging Pandemic Threats 
projects as appropriate. These partnerships are intended 
to ensure the longevity of the programme by building 
capacity in the most in-need regions. The programme’s 
For HealthMap see http://www.
healthmap.org/en/
For the ProMED website see 
http://www.promedmail.org
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scale gives some indication of how feasible this type of 
approach is for identifi cation of the many thousands of 
novel pathogens that are probably in wildlife globally. In 
the fi rst two years of the programme, around 
100 000 samples from 20 000 animals (mainly bats, 
rodents, and non-human primates) in 20 countries have 
yielded 150 novel viruses from families known to harbour 
zoonoses. These data will be used to further refi ne global 
hotspot mapping and modelling strategies and test 
hypotheses about zoonotic transmission. They will also 
be shared as open source information, after the 
appropriate country clear ances, through an interactive 
application at HealthMap.org. In selected high-risk 
regions, the associations be tween viral diversity, biological 
diversity, patterns of human contact with wildlife and 
livestock, and changes in land use are being explored to 
decipher the rules that govern disease emergence.
The ultimate goal of the Emerging Pandemic Threats 
programme is to develop a strategy to prevent future 
pandemics at the source before they infect human 
beings—an ambitious goal that requires more than 
building of health-care capacity or surveillance and 
diagnostic programmes. The chal lenge to true pandemic 
prevention (and pre-emption) is how to address the 
underlying drivers that are essentially ecological (eg, 
juxtaposition of livestock production and wildlife 
populations) or occur on large spatial scales because of 
economic activity (eg, change in land use related to 
development of tropical forests).1 In the case of both 
Nipah virus14 and H5N1,87,88 economic develop ment 
resulted in changes to animal production that led to the 
opening of a new niche for a pathogen. Could the 
seemingly opposing forces of economic development and 
public health have been reconciled before rather than 
after these outbreaks occurred? Expansion of so-called 
health impact assessments is a possible approach.12 
Incentives for industries with roles in activities that 
propagate pandemics could be linked to development 
initiatives. For example, concessions in development of 
logging or mining could include better food supply chains 
as an alternative to bushmeat hunting, better clinics for 
migrant workers than are available, and more intensive 
surveillance of livestock at these crucial interfaces. 
Similarly, eff orts to curtail the wildlife trade for food and 
pets in hotspot and other countries could include creation 
of incentives for consumers that lead to certifi cation of 
industries promoting healthy practices.
Conclusion
The basis on which to build a global pandemic preven-
tion strategy has changed substantially over the past few 
decades. A newly revised global reporting system of 
outbreaks and new molecular methods for pathogen 
identifi cation and discovery are available, and advances 
in communications technology—eg, access to mobile 
phones and the Internet, even in remote areas—have 
enabled improved reporting. The early identifi cation of a 
new human coronavirus respiratory disease from Saudi 
Arabia89 and a novel haemorrhagic fever virus in central 
Africa90 are examples of the great improvement in 
surveillance capabilities.
Understanding of the process of emergence and spread 
has moved from anecdotal through analytical to poten-
tially predictive. Researchers are positioned to move 
from a paucity of data to a wealth of information on 
potential pathogens in nature. The challenge is to develop 
the basic research agenda to allow potential pathogens to 
be distinguished from harmless microbes by use of 
molecular sequence data only (the most commonly 
collected information), or information that can be 
deduced from these data—eg, structures of key proteins.
Political will for countries to act together to strengthen 
global networks against pandemic emergence also seems 
to have become positive. This new approach to pandemic 
prevention is shown by the handling of the discovery, in 
1997, of a highly pathogenic infl uenza A (H5N1) of avian 
origin that infects people (precursor of the now widespread 
H5N1 avian infl uenza).91 Since then, and despite the 
virus’s continued inability to transmit eff ectively between 
people, the public health community has recognised that 
a lethal virus circulating only in wildlife and domestic 
animals creates extraordinary opportunities to mitigate 
future risk.64 The response to H5N1 has implicated not 
only clinical, diagnostic, and therapeutic advances, but 
also better understanding of avian ecology, the economics 
of poultry production in low-income countries, and the 
ecology of the virus across the virus’s broad host range. 
For perhaps the fi rst time, the response to a zoonotic 
pandemic has included development agencies improving 
individual countries’ abilities to identify new zoonoses 
early and mitigate quickly any new health threats arising 
within their borders.
The challenge is to establish whether and how re-
searchers can intervene before a pathogen reaches the 
human population and develop appropriate triggers for 
action. Zoonotic diseases, by defi nition, should be a key 
mission of human-health agencies, agricultural author-
ities and producers, and natural resource managers, 
all working cooperatively. Substantial investments in each 
of these challenges are essential because the ecological 
and social changes worldwide that allow the emergence 
of infectious diseases are increasing at an unprecedented 
rate. Integration of eff orts and coord ination of budgetary 
resources for prevention and control is clearly a challenge 
that governments, both local and national, need to 
confront, and building of capacity to sustain these eff orts 
might be the greatest challenge of all.
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